Evidence: Nonconsensual Taking of Blood for an Alcohol Content Test Not an Unreasonable Search in California by Burke, John A.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 7
1-1957
Evidence: Nonconsensual Taking of Blood for an
Alcohol Content Test Not an Unreasonable Search
in California
John A. Burke
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
John A. Burke, Evidence: Nonconsensual Taking of Blood for an Alcohol Content Test Not an Unreasonable Search in California, 9
Hastings L.J. 77 (1957).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol9/iss1/7
NOTES
EVIDENCE: NONCONSENSUAL TAKING OF BLOOD FOR AN ALCOHOL CONTENT
TEST NOT AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH IN CALIFORNIA
An auto sped down a side road toward a main boulevard somewhere in Merced
County, California. It neither stopped nor slowed for the arterial, but shot across it,
collided with a warning sign opposite the side road and came to rest in an irrigation
ditch. The three occupants of the car were found unconscious. One of them clasped
a wine bottle in one hand and a beer can in the other. Beer cans were on the floor of
the car and each of the three men had the odor of alcohol on his breath.
At the hospital where the driver of the car, Paul Duroncelay, was taken, the
investigating highway patrol officer requested that Duroncelay be given a blood
alcohol test. When asked whether he consented to the test, Duroncelay, who was
conscious but "quite sick at the time and throwing up," gave neither a negative nor
an affirmative answer. However, when a nurse approached him with a needle, he
withdrew his arm. The county coroner held his arm while the nurse extracted the
blood. The sample taken showed an alcoholic content of .22 per cent. A person is
considered under the influence of alcohol and no longer capable of operating a
motor vehicle with normal skill or judgment if the alcoholic content of his blood is
.15 per cent by volume.1
Subsequently Duroncelay was tried and convicted by a jury for violation of
section 501 of the Vehicle Code, which makes it a felony to drive an automobile
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The results of the blood alcohol
test were admitted in evidence by the trial court over objection. On appeal of this
case, People v. Duroncelay,2 the California Supreme Court held that even though
the defendant had not consented to the taking of his blood, the admission in evi-
dence of the chemical analysis of the blood showing intoxication was not a viola-
tion of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination,3 unreasonable search
and seizure,4 nor a denial of his right to due process of law.5
This is not the first case in which the results of a nonconsensual blood alcohol
test were ruled admissable in evidence. California precedent dates back to 1948.6
But the Duroncelay decision is of major importance, for in resolving the unreason-
able search and seizure objection, it in effect establishes the legality of the noncon-
sensual blood alcohol test. Prior to the case of People v. Cakan7 in 1955, California
courts operated under a nonexclusionary rule in regard to evidence illegally ob-
I Ladd and Gibson, The Medico Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication,
24 IowA L. Rxv. 191 (1939), and Legal Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine Intoxic-
tion, 29 VA. L. Rxv. 749 (1943).
248 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957).
3 CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 13: "No person ... shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a
witness against himself." (Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.)
4 Id. § 19: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated...." (Fourth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution.)
5 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law... 21
6 People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948).
7 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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tained; 8 that is, evidence is not inadmissible merely because it is illegally obtained
(as, for instance, by illegal search and seizure). Because of this rule the unreason-
able search and seizure question had never been put in issue, and hence the legal-
ity of the nonconsensual blood alcohol test was never determined; in fact, the test
had generally been considered illegal.9
To fully comprehend the significance of the Duroncelay decision, then, one
must systematically examine the constitutional objections to the nonconsensual
blood alcohol test and the courts' rulings on such objections.
The question of the admissibility in evidence of the results of a nonconsensual
blood alcohol test was first raised in People v. Tucker.10 Defendant Tucker was
convicted of drunk driving, and part of the evidence against him was the chemical
analysis of a blood sample taken from him while he was in a semiconscious state.
In his appeal defendant objected on the grounds of self-incrimination. In answer-
ing the objection, the District Court of Appeal stressed the fact that there was no
"compulsion" in this case. The court said:
"It would appear that upon the laying of the proper foundation such evidence is ad-
missable. . . it is generally held in other states that where the accused is compelled to
submit to such tests against his will it violates his constitutional right in that he may
not 'be compelled to give testimony against himself' ... . Other cases hold that where
there is no evidence of compulsion or entrapment such evidence is admissible." 11
A much more decisive answer to the self-incrimination objection is made by
the California Supreme Court in People v. Haeussler.12 There the court noted the
distinction between real evidence and oral testimony. The results of blood alcohol
tests would categorically be considered real evidence. According to Wigmore43
and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Holt v. United States,'14 the
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and similar state constitutional pro-
visions apply solely to oral testimony. The protection against self-incrimination is
not extended to evidence taken from a person's body, and the California court in
the Haeussler case cites numerous examples in which a person's body was used in
evidence. 5
The denial of due process of law objection raised against the nonconsensual
blood alcohol test grew out of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Rockin v. California.16 In that case the Court held that the extraction of morphine
capsules violently (by means of stomach pumping) and against petitioner's will
was "conduct which shocks the conscience."" The Court said:
8 People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. 2d 169, 137 P.2d 1 (1943) ; People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165,
124 P.2d 44 (1942); People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922); People v. Le Doux,
155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909). These cases were overruled by People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d
434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
9 See language in People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948); People v.
Kiss, 125 Cal. App. 2d 138, 269 P.2d 941 (1954).
10 88 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948).
11 Id. at 343, 198 P.2d at 947.
1241 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 931 (1954).
13 8 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940).
14 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
15 41 Cal. 2d at 257, 260 P.2d at 11; see cases cited in 25 A.L.R. 2d 1407 (1952).
16342 U.S. 165 (1952).
17 I. at 172.
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"[T]his course of proceeding by agents of the government to obtain evidence is bound
to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too dose to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."'I s
Consequently, the utilization of evidence so obtained to convict defendant was
held a denial of due process. This, maintained the opponents of the nonconsensual
blood alcohol test, was the rule of law that should be applied to the admissibility
of the result of such a test-that the forced extraction of blood from defendant's
veins, against his will, for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in trial
against him, was an unconstitutional denial of due process of law.
This line of reasoning was thoroughly disapproved by the California Supreme
Court in the case of People v. Haeussler,19 where the use of findings obtained from
a nonconsensual blood alcohol test was upheld in a manslaughter conviction. The
high court disapproved the proposition that Rochin was based on the "premise
that the taking of evidence from the person of a defendant or by entry into his
body is the decisive factor."' 2 Instead, it was the entire course of events, the forced
entry into defendant's home without a warrant, the violent attempt to pry his
mouth open, and the later stomach pumping which was "found to be brutal and
shocking," and hence a denial of due process. "The taking of a blood test," con-
cluded the California Supreme Court, "when accomplished in a medically ap-
proved manner does not smack of brutality...."-"
In the case of Breithaupt v. A brarn,ra on certiorari from the Supreme Court
of New Mexico, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence obtained
from a nonconsensual blood alcohol test was admissible against defendant in an
involuntary manslaughter trial, and the taking of the blood did not amount to such
"brutality" as to bring it under the Rockin due process rule. Thus, the due process
objection to the nonconsensual blood alcohol test has been effectively put down.
As was noted above, evidence obtained illegally was admissible in the Califor-
nia courts up until 1955, for the origin of evidence was not looked into.23 This,
however, was changed in that year by the decision in People v. Cahan24 in which
the California Supreme Court reversed its earlier holdings and held that evidence
obtained through unlawful means, for instance, unreasonable search and seizure,
was not admissible. This change in the law called for a re-evaluation of the con-
stitutionality of the nonconsensual blood alcohol test to determine whether it was
a violation of defendant's protection against unreasonable search and seizure. If
the taking of blood from a defendant without his consent for the purpose of the
test were to be ruled an unreasonable search and seizure, the decision of the Cahan
case would render such evidence inadmissible against the defendant.
The unreasonable search and seizure issue was not resolved in the Breithaupt
case, because the United States Supreme Court had previously held that in a state
court for a state crime the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
does not forbid the admission of relevant evidence even though obtained by un-
reasonable search and seizure. 2
5
Is Ibid.
19 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953).2 0 Id. at 259, 260 P.2d at 12.
2 1 Id. at 260, 260 P.2d at 12.
22352 U.S. 432 (1957).
23 See cases cited in note 8 supra.
2444 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
25 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1944) ; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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The court in Duroncelay was confronted with, and could no longer avoid re-
solving, the unreasonable search and seizure issue in a nonconsensual blood alcohol
test case. The opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson gave first consideration to what
would constitute a reasonable search in the circumstances of the case at hand.
2 8
It would be reasonable to make a search of the person of the defendant and the
area under his control if the investigating officer had reason to believe a felony had
been committed. This would properly involve a search of defendant's pockets and
his automobile. Recalling the facts of the case-the accident, the odor of alcohol
about defendant and the condition of the occupants of the car, and the scattered
beer cans-one could reasonably believe a felony had been committed. "The ques-
tion to be determined here," said the court, "is whether the taking of a sample of
*.. [defendant's] blood for an alcohol test was a matter of such a different char-
acter that it must be regarded as an unreasonable search and seizure. '27 In decid-
ing this question the court stressed the fact that the extraction of defendant's blood
was made in a medically approved manner. It took cognizance of statistics con-
cerning highway fatalities, as well as the effects of alcohol upon drivers. It noted
the lack of hardship or pain involved in extracting blood and "the scientific reli-
ability of blood alcohol tests in establishing guilt or innocence." 28 This reasoning
led unavoidably to the conclusion that the nonconsensual taking of blood for an
alcoholic content test does not violate the constitutional protection against un-
reasonable search and seizure.
Thus, the legality of the nonconsensual blood alcohol test has been established
in California. However, there is language in some of the older cases which has
never been disapproved or clarified and which raises one final issue to be answered.
May the accused refuse to submit to the taking of a blood alcohol test? The lan-
guage referred to is found in People v. Tucker,29 where it was said:
"1... where the accused is compelled to submit to such tests against his will it violates
his constitutional right .... ,,30
Similar language also appears in People v. McGinnis,31 where the court held that
evidence of defendant's refusal to take an intoximeter test could be used against
him, but said:
"A person, arrested because it appears that he is intoxicated, may have the right to
refuse to subject himself to any of the usual tests, or to the intoximeter test .... 32
This same thinking-that a defendant may refuse to submit to the blood alcohol
test-is quite evident in the very recent Breithaupt decision and gave rise to vig-
orous dissents. In the majority opinion Mr. Justice Clark evidenced this thinking
when he wrote:
"To be sure, the driver here was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence
of conscious consent, Without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation
of a constitutional right.. .. "33 (Emphasis added.)
26 48 Cal. 2d at 693, 312 P.2d at 693.
27 Id. at ........ , 312 P.2d at 694.
28 Ibid.
29 88 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948).
3 0 Id. at 343, 198 P.2d at 947.
a3 123 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 945, 267 P.2d 458 (1954) ; criticized in 42 CAIXF. L. REv. 697
(1954).
52 123 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 948, 267 P.2d at 460.
83 352 U.S. at 435.
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